

THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMIT: BUSINESS AND THE HAWKE GOVERNMENT

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When the Labor Government was formed it promised to hold a national economic summit at which government, business and the trade unions would be represented. This placed business in an unusual and uncomfortable situation. For once it would be necessary for business to argue its case in a contested public arena. Whereas in the Arbitration Commission internal divisions between different parts of business are muted by the common concern to control and limit the rate of wage increases, at the Summit the weakness of business's political organizations would be fully exposed. It should be noted that this was evident from the day on which the invitations were dispatched since, along with the leaders of the Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI) and a representative sample of other business organizations, eighteen of the directors of Australia's largest companies were invited.¹ These included such people as Sir Roderick Carnegie (CRA), A.W.Coates (AMP), B.T.Loton (BHP), Sir Arvi Parbo (Westen Mining), and Sir Peter Abeles (TNT).² Not surprisingly, some of these were the business friends of Bob Hawke.³ On the whole, Hawke's invitees represented larger and more important firms than those in the CAI. Here was a problem for business at the Summit: the possibility that this division could be exploited by the Government.

Then there was the problem of what to argue in such a forum. The ACTU's position was already stated in the Accord. But business had not established a comparable stance.⁴ Thus when it got to the Summit it had to both develop its position and present it in public forums. Journalists were quick to interpret this as business weakness.⁵ They were much too quick in their judgement and failed to notice that the essential ground for private capital had already been conceded by both government and the trade unions. In the Accord the primacy of private ownership and private profitability had been enshrined. Hence, the Summit needed only to deal with tactical matters in a strategy for the political management of a capitalist recession. With so much done for them, the divisions amongst business may have produced awkwardness but never disaster.

Don Hughes (Cadbury-Schweppes), the Chairman of CAI, opened the argument for business in a speech which reflected the dominant and traditional concerns of Australian industry. Thus protection was seen as a good thing, labour costs were a major cause of the economy's problems and the role of government was to restore the profitability of private capital and to ensure a stable environment within which business could plan its future.⁶ The major concern of government should be to fight inflation first and to reduce real wages to restore company profitability. A concern for unemployment was subordinate to this. The speech lacked political subtlety. Even more so did the speech by Sir Roderick Carnegie at the end of the day.⁷ Sir Roderick made a number of telling observations about business's response to the fact of a government-trade union accord. For example,

Under the Accord, the ACTU would have to assume a unique responsibility for self-regulation. *The outcome of this one-sided approach could be a reluctance on the part of companies to invest confidently or to expand their operations.* (emphasis added)⁸

and

No Federal government can move away from the responsibility of making decisions in the interests of all Australians. The Accord assumes that the unions should have a major say over government decisions. I doubt that a voluntary association, whether it is on the side of unions or of business, should be placed in that position. This Summit, being largely made up of people who work in such voluntary associations, can only advise governments. The Government must bear the responsibility for the decisions it must take.⁹

The mood of embattled business in opposition to both the unions and government was carried

on by Sir Keith Campbell. Yet even here there was a change. Sir Keith conceded that the 'fight inflation first' strategy was inappropriate, and agreed that what was needed was "to fight unemployment and inflation simultaneously".¹⁰ Nonetheless, he extrapolated from the economic scenarios a formula linking wage restraint to reducing unemployment which became the main expression of business opinion on the subject.

The broad but very clear messages were: The longer the wage pause and the lower the wage adjustments, the lower the rate of inflation, the higher the rate of growth and the lower the rate of unemployment. ... If we genuinely care about the jobless and genuinely wish to incur discipline and sacrifice, we need to put together a scenario D.¹¹

It was in this context that he offered, on behalf of business, to freeze the salaries of management and the remuneration of directors.

Such an offer revealed a willingness to bargain in the context of the Economic Summit. The formal submission of the CAI to the Summit stressed the importance of 'restoring' profitability in the private sector.¹² One of their goals in attending the Summit was to have that concern protected. The focus on employment shifted discussion away from it. Thus it was necessary to invent a formula that went beyond their familiar claim that a wage rise meant increased unemployment and that wage restraint, or a wage freeze, held out the hope of job maintenance.¹³

It was necessary to argue that job creation depended on boosting the profitability of private firms since increased profitability would encourage increased investment which would lead to increased investment with increased growth and increased employment. There was a major problem in giving practical expression to this argument. Business could not put numbers to the implied equation: it could not say, for example, that if the rate of wage increases was reduced by 10% and the rate of profit was increased by 8% that investment would increase by 5% and that this would reduce unemployment by 2.5% in a given year. It is not that they did not have faith in the capacity of industry to promote employment. What they lacked was the kind of economic organization to make such a proposition plausible. Business at an economic level is fundamentally divided and the different sections of business faced different and sometimes contradictory, situations. On top of that, the political organization of business was nowhere remotely close to being able to negotiate and to plan (let alone enforce) such an initiative. (It is interesting to note of course, that labour could and did make offers of a similar complexity.)

In the economic and political circumstances that prevailed business had two opportunities to increase its profitability without having to concede anything specific on investment and job creation. It could press for a reduction in the rate of wage increases and the impact of government taxes, charges and other regulations that increase costs. The importance of this emphasis on wage costs and taxation is that it can be phrased in terms of a programme which is neutral in its impact on the different sectors of business. Further, it requires almost no significant changes in the behaviour of business; investment does not have to increase, sales can be held constant, productivity does not have to improve dramatically and still more secure profits can be earned.¹⁴

The programme demanded by business fitted these to the political circumstances which then prevailed. For example, speaker after speaker from the business community emphasized the value of the wage pause, wished it to continue for as long as possible, reluctantly accepted the return to centralized wage fixation in the Arbitration Commission and in that context argued against any possible 'catch-up' claims, wanted Commission decisions to take into account the different circumstances of different sectors of the economy under the slogan of 'the ability to pay', to discount indexation for increases caused by changes in exchange rate and by increases in government charges.¹⁵ Business also argued for a change in the taxation system (from direct to indirect taxes), for a decline in the incidence of company taxation, for the preservation or increase of investment and export allowances and for a general reduction in formal regulation of business activities.¹⁶

The position taken by business representatives at the Summit was not an expression of their purest and innermost desires but showed a shrewd assessment of what was possible in the given political circumstances. Initially business enjoyed good relations with the Fraser Government

and supported the broad contours of its policy initiatives. The fact that the economy had not fared well lessened their enthusiasm for Fraser but it is hard to believe that it caused a fundamental change in their position. It was the dramatic electoral success of the Hawke Government that forced business to rethink its tactical options. Although it was possible to set out the broad objections to trade unions and interventionist government it would have been unwise to reject the new government completely. So long as the Liberal-National Party remained an implausible alternative government then it was necessary to see what could be won from the Hawke Labor Government.

Such tactical manoeuvres can be seen in the declarations of sympathy and support for the Hawke Government, the endorsement of the Economic Summit and the way in which business presented its demands.¹⁷ For example, although business was hostile to government spending and large public sector deficits it supported the proposed size of the budget deficit for 1983-4 on pragmatic grounds and argued that, in the circumstances, this would not have detrimental effects on the private sector.¹⁸ It was also evident in the acceptance of centralized wage fixation, an acceptance couched in terms of much suspicion, doubt and hostility.¹⁹ It should be noted that they did not endorse a return to wage indexation, although in the context of the Summit and the Accord this is what their position implied.

Let us consider what business got out of the Summit. The return to centralized and indexed wage fixation included no great concessions to business. In line with their arguments, but almost certainly not because of them, there was to be no 'catch up' claim. It would be unrealistic to have expected business to get more than this. The wage-freeze may have given them a great deal of satisfaction but business, like everyone else, knew that it could not last forever. To the extent that business wanted an orderly and predictable wage environment, they got it. This does not mean that they approved of either the 1983 or the 1985 wage case decisions. It is interesting to note that although business was generally hostile to any suggestions that 'corporatist' relations between government and class organizations were a good thing, business representatives used the logic of corporatist arguments to stress the need for the ACTU to discipline its members so that no claims were pressed outside the wage fixing guidelines.²⁰

On the matter of government taxes, charges and regulation business was somewhat more successful. Here it should be borne in mind that in the short term this did not mean very much. But in the long term this has gained greater significance. In this regard it is useful to observe that only big business speakers pressed the Government to means test all welfare payments and other government transfers.²¹ Superannuation reform, the assets test for pensions, the attempt to reintroduce tertiary fees attest to the significance and the attraction of this pleading. There was also the promise to hold further negotiations over reforming the taxation system.²² The setting up of EPAC with its tri-partite structure and independent secretariat meant that business would have a formal presence on par with that of the trade unions.²³ Not much was said about reducing the amount of government regulation. The subsequent granting of banking licences to sixteen foreign banks probably indicates something about the way in which this argument was going.²⁴

How then did business view the Summit at its end? There is a good deal of evidence that business was affected by the spirit of compromise and the conciliatory attitude of the trade unions.²⁵

Although Sir Peter Abeles (TNT) shared this view he expressed more of the political challenge of the Summit to the business community. He identified a need to modernize the political organizations of business.

From the performance of their leaders during this Conference, I am sure that the business sector can draw the conclusion that to make the system work the business side need strong organization around which it can rally. It is absolutely vital that the business community as a whole expeditiously support one suitable structure which will have the ability to speak as one unified centralised group on behalf of the business community on terms of equality with the ACTU. In making this comment I recognise that we have never given our associations the opportunity to have the same

strong structure. I recommend that resolving this situation should be our most urgent priority after this Summit.²⁶

Most importantly, Sir Peter reflected on the nature of the Accord with some understanding of the implications of tripartite politics.

... To formalise what we have experienced and agreed over the past four days I challenge you, sir, I challenge the government and the ACTU to make a bilateral agreement into a trilateral agreement. I make this challenge as the private sector provides 75 per cent of employment in Australia. Therefore, it would be only an extension of the spirit of this Summit if business were incorporated as the third party of this accord, as an equal partner. I am sure that you, sir, would not like to feel, as most of us felt during the early days of this Conference, as though we had been invited to play singles tennis against a championship doubles combination.²⁷

These remarks set out part of the programme facing business after the Summit since they identify what was needed for business to function more effectively in the new political structures being grafted onto the existing relationship between politics and economics.

After the Summit

(1) The Incomplete Reform of Business Organization

Even before the Summit was held Bob Hawke had questioned the CAI's claim to be either an effective or a representative organization.²⁸ Admittedly this was as a response to CAI criticism of the ALP-ACTU prices and incomes accord in the midst of the election campaign. Hawke's selective invitation of 'independent' business figures underlined these doubts about the structure and efficacy of business organization. What happened at the Summit, highlighted by journalists' comment²⁹ made it imperative that something be done about the fragmented character of business organization. The first thing that happened was the institutionalization of the role of 'independents' in the formation of the Business Council of Australia (BCA) from the amalgamation of the Business Round Table and the Australian Industrial Development Association.³⁰ This gave big business a much more organized presence in the political system. But it did nothing to overcome the division in business political representation.³¹ The CAI itself was challenged by both the Metal Trades Industry Association and the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers.³² As yet nothing has happened to overcome this political fragmentation.³³

It is interesting to note that the Labor Government has been keen to encourage the reform and centralization of business organization.³⁴ This desire stems from the political logic of the strategy which the Government is pursuing in its management of the recession. The life of the Government would be far easier if business would speak with a single voice or at least a voice comparable to that of the ACTU.³⁵ This is to miss the serious divisions within business that provide the material basis for its fragmented organization. Within all business organization there is a permanent tension between large and small firms which cannot be gestured away for organizational convenience. Similarly, the problem of the recession is not experienced in the same way in all sectors of the economy, nor is it self evident or axiomatic that any policy will be equally beneficial across the range of that diversity. Further, whatever happens in politics the prime relationship of business to business is an economic one mediated through the market. So the importance of political organization will vary from sector to sector and from firm to firm.

Although not given as much prominence as the attempt to reorganize business representation there was a move in business circles to press the Government for access to ACTU-Government negotiations over a renewal of the Accord.³⁶ This call was prompted by recognition that the Hawke Government appeared likely to be in office for some time and that although EPAC provided an important forum for expressing business views it was a less significant venue than direct tripartite negotiations. It is difficult to determine just how serious this request was. It may just have been a counter to trade union demands for the setting up of a tripartite industrial council with some planning role. The Government and the trade unions rejected business's request: the Government and business rejected the ACTU request.³⁷

(2) Business Support for the ALP

The election held in 1984 saw unprecedented business support of the re-election of a Hawke Labor Government. This was most obvious in the editorial support in almost all Australian papers. (In 1972, when Whitlam was elected, only the *Australian* had supported him.) It was also evident in the comments by the new president of the CAI, Mr Ken Williams.³⁸ The new president of the Business Council of Australia, Mr Robert White (Westpac), gave an explicit endorsement for the re-election of the Government. In an interview with the *Financial Review* he commented favourably on this as compared with previous Labor Governments. For example,

Reflecting on business's acceptance of the Hawke Government, Mr White referred "as a banker" to the Chifley Government's attempt to nationalise the private banks and the "irresponsible" wages policy of the Whitlam Government.

"Those ingredients have just been totally absent in this Government," Mr White said. "It has been much more pragmatic and very much more in tune with the needs of business."

Asked for a business message to a re-elected Hawke Government, he said: "My message would be more of the same with great care on the general approach to the costs of operating business."³⁹

As Michael Stutchbury remarked

Mr White's comments illustrate the unprecedented lack of hostility and even support for a Federal Labor Government that business is showing towards the Hawke Government - or at least towards Mr Hawke, the Treasurer, Mr Keating, and the Minister for Industry and Commerce, Senator Button.⁴⁰

This was eagerly picked up by Bob Hawke, although there are indications that some in the BCA did not support this identification with business's traditional political opponents.⁴¹ The CAI stopped short of such an endorsement. It seemed content with the appearance of even-handedness but given its past and public political alignment this was significant.⁴² The Australian Chamber of Commerce also sought an even-handed response but its comments on what a Federal Government should do appeared to favour Labor.⁴³ In the context of this level of support some concern was expressed in the Party over the possibility that it would be seen as "a banker's party for not just business but big business".⁴⁴

The significance of these views by business is clear and yet it should not be exaggerated. There were many in the high councils of business who retained their affection for the Liberal Party and who viewed this accommodation with distrust.⁴⁵ It must be borne in mind that these remarks were made at a time when the Liberal Party was in disarray and with no serious possibility of winning the election. It should also be noted that Peacock's performance has revived the vision of the Liberal Party as an alternative government. This partly explains the greater distance between business and the Labor Government in its second term of office.

(3) The Recovery and Business Issues

After the Economic Summit and the implementation of the agreed housing programme, the benefits from the end of the drought and the American recovery the general situation for business in Australia improved. This in a sense created a dilemma for business. In the depths of recession it could bargain with Government on the basis of its ability to increase employment. With recovery, which included a clear improvement in the profitability of the private sector and limited improvements in unemployment, this bargaining option was weakened.⁴⁶ Admittedly, the logic behind their position was restated for youth unemployment and a demand that junior wage rates should be cut⁴⁷ and although this has received support from EPAC it has won neither the argument in the Arbitration Court nor the political endorsement of the Labor Government.

The renewed vigour of business's demands can be seen in the wage-fixing arena. The CAI

vigorously opposed the 1985 wage indexation decision, arguing all the points about government charges, negative movements in the CPI, productivity changes, junior pay rates and the question of the ability of different sectors to meet any general pay increase granted.⁴⁸ The decision of the Arbitration Commission to discount the CPI was a reward for their efforts. The fact that no allowance was made for their junior pay case was a recognition that business could not put figures to this equation either.

The vigour of business's arguments could also be seen in their determined opposition to the development of a national superannuation scheme,⁴⁹ their demand that the Government not abandon generous investment, export and depreciation allowances⁵⁰ and their concern that Government regulation of business be cut to a minimum. They got a tripartite body to look at regulation but little satisfaction on the first accounts. When the 1984 Budget came round business again sought to reduce the size of the deficit and to get a Government commitment to greatly reduce public spending.⁵¹ Within EPAC the business leaders conceded the Government's case over the deficit and the general management of the recovery phase of the recession. This was seen by sections of business as an unnecessary sign of complicity with the Government's strategy. Business was also opposed to the Arbitration decision on technological change, retrenchments and information sharing, which they argued would increase costs, deter investment and erode managerial prerogatives.⁵²

The economic Summit and the 1984 election campaign had set the scene for a comprehensive review of the taxation structure and the holding of another tripartite conference, the taxation summit. Business had been pressing for some time for a move away from direct to indirect taxes and a complete reshaping of business taxation.⁵³ Their goals were to lessen the 'cost' of investment and profit and to increase incentives for those who earn more. In the CAI's submission there was some support for capital gains taxation.⁵⁴ Later, in the EPAC discussion of tax reform, the BCA nominees, Coates (AMP) and Kelman (CSR), endorsed the introduction of some form of capital gains tax. Naturally this increased tension amongst business's political representatives. Most business organizations were not willing to go so far.⁵⁵ Still, it was on the issue of taxation that the heads of all major business peak organizations met in an attempt to secure a unified approach to the question.⁵⁶ This was the first time that such a meeting had taken place.

Conclusion

After the sacking of the Whitlam Government, the problem for Labor was often stated in the following way: if business got so upset at the limited social and economic initiatives of the Whitlam Government, what chance was there for reformist politics in Australia? It followed from this perspective that the first priority was to construct a Labor Party that could win election and stay in office for a considerable number of years. Towards the end of this time the Labor Party would have become the natural party of government and would then be able to make substantial reforms. The Hawke Labor Government has been the almost perfect embodiment of this tactical obsession. Its behaviour has been calculated to offend the powerful as little as possible and in doing so the search for consensus has been a skilful political technique. This technique has not been used to impose reformist goals on the reactionary, the wealthy or the powerful. Rather it has been used to limit effective opposition to the Government's strategy for managing the recession from both business and the trade unions. Although this has involved a degree of organizational and policy balancing, it does not mean that business and labour have been equally served by the strategy. The strategy is risky in that it courts political opposition from both classes. In assessing the strategy it is necessary to remember both the general class context and the passage through the recession.

The Hawke Labor Government has not been conspicuous for its reforming pro-labour initiatives. With the exception of Medicare (itself quite a limited initiative) little has been done to improve the position of the least well off members of the population. This is not to say that the Labor Government has done nothing and is not interested in reform. It is just a question of the reforms they have introduced: assets tests, the deregulation of banking, entry of foreign banks, abolition of exchange controls and the floating of the Australian dollar. This is an

impressive list in its own right. Interestingly, these are not the reforms associated with Labor politics in this country. They would sit more happily with the initiatives of a neo-liberal or free market party.

Just because these policies harness, or appeal to market forces does not mean that they are the policies of business or indeed seen that way by the firms concerned. Consider, for example, this comment on the entry of foreign banks by Bob White (Head of BCA and of Westpac):

I have always advocated that the door should be open to foreign banks but I don't know that I have ever advocated that the door locking them out should be ripped off its hinges and thrown away.⁵⁷

Nonetheless, these policies bolster the general social and economic hegemony of private capital. They also bring advantages to new sections of business, as for example those banks that gained entry. Such qualifications are essential when considering the power exercised by business in the present political context. It is not that business is winning a great deal on the basis of their own exertions. As often as not they are thwarted on detail. This does not mean that business as the class of private capital lacks power and significance. It means that such power is not effectively exerted through the political operations of its business organizations. It also reveals that in the present political and economic circumstances, business interests are not being advanced through the articulation of policy by these organizations.

The pattern of government policy is not to be explained by business efforts or the close links that do exist between business and prominent Labor politicians. Rather, the pattern is to be explained by reference to the character of the Labor Party as it has been constructed in the post-Whitlam era and the electoral strategies within which they frame their programme. It is here that the social position of capital is enshrined in the clear, uncompromising and unambiguous acceptance of the primacy of private capital and the legitimacy and desirability of private profit. This is evident in the attitude of the Government to both the causes and the cures for the recession: business is not really to blame, and business profitability needs to be restored first. The strategy differs from the Fraser Government's on many points: it is more dedicated to deregulation, the primacy of market relations, the reduction of government spending and budget deficits and it is more subtle in its approach to the trade unions and the winning of wage restraint. In all its actions and in all its conceptions it recognises and accomodates itself to the realities of the class forces as presently represented in the institutions of Australian politics. Even though the Government may be on automatic pilot as far as business interests are concerned there is no guarantee that its actions will be viewed in the light. Despite its tame character this government too will face the consolidated political opposition of business organizations when either the progress of recovery and recession renders its subtlety unnecessary or the Liberal Party rehabilitates itself as a vehicle for business's political activism.


Notes

1. "Employers aim at summit", Financial Review [FR], 7 March 83, p.2; "Top businessmen to devise their tactics for summit", FR, 5 April 83, p.3; "Employers lobby for seats at summit", FR, 10 April 83.
2. The full list of business representatives is given on p.viii of NESC, Vol. 2.
3. B. Toohey and Julie Flynn, "The big business friendships of Bob Hawke", National Times, 11-17 July 82, p.3; M. Westfield, "Why business backs Hawke", Australian Business, 2 Nov. 83, pp.12-17.
4. As an illustration see the submission to the Summit by the CAI and the Australian Industries Development Association (AIDA) published as NESC, Vol.3 Documents submitted: participants and observers.
5. "Business wrong-footed", FR, 13 April 83, p.1; "The harsh realities of the economic summit ducked", FR, 15 April 83, pp.3+5; "Not a bad summit", FR, 15 April 83, p.12; "Business 'rabble' rethinks", FR, 14 April 83, pp.1+10; "Employers must make concessions", FR, 12 April 83, p.12.
6. NESC, Vol.2, pp.8-12.
7. "Carnegie's hard line hits nerves...", FR, 12 April 83, pp.1+10 which prompted the editorial "Employers must make concessions" cited above.
8. NESC, Vol.2, p.41.

9. ibid.,
10. ibid., p.63.
11. ibid.,
12. NESC, Vol.3, pp.326, 327, 328, 333.
13. John Laird expressed the position in the following way: "Until recovery comes I would like to see a banner emblazoned right across Australia with the words 'increased wages and incomes equals increased unemployment' and perhaps a smaller banner that says 'income restraint equals job preservation'". NESC, Vol.2, p.148
14. Note the suspicion expressed by the CAI of the 'thread of target setting' which ran through the Kirby report and the discussion of its implementation. "CAI pulls the plug on trainee plan". FR, 28 Feb. 85, p.5; see also "Business Council urges higher profits before fresh investment", FR, 10 Sept. 84.
15. NESC, Vol. 2, pp.10-11, 49-63, 76, 92-3, 100-101, 106, 107-8, 109, 114, 125-6, 127, 128, 129-30, 131-2, 133, 167, 170, 177-8, 183-4, 185.
16. For a clear statement of this case see the CAI submission to the Summit, NESC, Vol.3, pp.319-92.
17. For example, Mr Litten (Australian Manufacturers' Export Council), "Mr Prime Minister...On behalf of the AMEC I place on record our support for the Government's initiative in calling this Conference and our strong wish that it became an annual event. AMEC will work enthusiastically to seek solutions to Australia's current economic difficulties." NESC, Vol.2, p.71.
18. For example, Mr Kelman (CSR), NESC, Vol.2, p.128; Mr Gibbons (Council of Small Business Organisations of Australia), ibid., pp.148-9. Note that this was on the third day of the conference.
19. For example, Mr Polites (CAI), ibid., pp.125-6.
20. "Mr Prime Minister, I make one other point and it must be said. It is that for the centralised system to work in the way all here want it to work it must have the support of all parties, all governments, all employers and unions. Without that total commitment it is doomed to failure. In this regard the commitment of the ACTU is of paramount importance and we welcome the forthright declaration of Mr Kely. He said that the trade union movement cannot escape the reality that if such a system is to work it will require a suppression of sectional interests. ibid., p.126; and Mr Dixon (Metal Trades Industry Association), "Accordingly, a commitment by the unions to a controlled, central system must necessarily involve a massive education campaign among their members at the grass roots level because it is at that level that the commitment is ultimately honoured or rejected. ibid., p.101.
21. See AIDA's submission to the Summit, NESC, Vol.3, pp.175-209 in which they argue for a freeze in the level of welfare payments (p.p.175,180,183) and for more means tested benefits, including an asset test on pensions (p.182); and the comments on means tests at the conference, NESC, Vol.2, pp.50, 64, 102.
22. Note that business organizations have consistently called for a change in the tax system away from direct to indirect taxes and have called for a major reduction in the incidence of company taxation. See AIDA's submission, NESC, Vol.3, pp.183-5 and the CAI submission ibid., pp.334-5 and comments at the conference such as NESC, Vol.2, pp.64,93,107,158.
23. Business strongly supported the setting up of EPAC as an independent body and even suggested that it was willing to share on its finance ibid., p. 188; see also pp.109, 127, 130, 149-50, 183, 187-8, 192
24. ABA, NESC, Vol.3, pp.25-34; see also Australian Merchant Bankers' Association ibid., pp.257-68, especially the comment on p. 265.
25. Don Hughes (CAI), NESC, Vol.2, p.201.
26. Sir Peter Abeles, ibid., p.194.
27. ibid.
28. "Hawke attacks CAI criticism", FR, 3 Feb. 83, p.3.
29. "A dingo-led recovery?", FR, 13 April 83, p.12; "Business wrong-footed", FR, 13 April 83, pp.1+10.
30. "Employer organizations struggle to change", FR, 8 Aug. 83, pp.10+14; "Outgunned employers study move for unity", FR, 14 April 83, p.4; "Big business calls its chieftains to a new peak council", FR, 2 June 83, p.3.
31. "Another voice for business on wages", FR, 12 Aug. 83, p.6; "' Business Cabinet' may rival CAI for employer support", FR, 3 Aug. 83, p.3.
32. "Employer groups in battle for dominance", FR, 16 Aug. 84, pp.1+8; "Employers slugging it out", FR, 20 Aug. 84, pp.1+8; "Manufacturers seek a new voice", FR, 27 Aug. 84.
33. "Chief executive commitment to BCA faces test", FR, 9 Jan. 85, pp.7+19; "'Peak business councils link on major issues", FR, 8 March 85, p.5; "Business groups at odds over taxation", FR, 28 March 85, pp.1+8; "Business groups 'not divided' on tax", FR, 29 March 85, p.3; "Factional politics are still rife

among the employers", FR, 3 April, 85, p.38.

34. "Hawke aims to unite employers", FR, 1 March, 83, pp.1+8.
35. For an interesting critique of Hawke's case, see the Financial Review editorial, "Hawke's corporate state", 12 Aug. 83.
36. "Calls for a new tri-partite prices and incomes accord", FR, 3 Sept, 84.
37. "Government opposes key ACTU accord plans", FR, 5 Oct. 83, p.3.
38. "Ambitious plans of new CAI president", FR, 7 Nov. 84; "CAI's new president calls for employer unity", FR, 23 Nov. 84, p.8.
39. "Business gives nod to Hawke's brand of Labor", FR, 12 Nov. 84, pp. 1+8.
40. ibid., p.8.
41. "Hawke to business 'More of the same'", FR, 13 Nov. 84, pp.1+8.
42. "CAI backs off from taking sides on party lines", FR, 13 Nov. 84, p.3.
43. "Chamber of Commerce backs some ALP policy", FR, 20 Nov. 84, p.7.
44. "'Bankers' Party': Defiant Hayden taunts Hawke", FR, 4 Dec. 84, pp.1+8.
45. "Elliot speaks out against the Australian Business Council", FR, 10 Jan 85, pp.1+4; see also "The Chamber limbers up", FR, 16 April 84, pp.1+8.
46. This may seem strange but consider the frequency with which the CAI opposed optimism on the recovery as it was happening, "CAI sees few signs of economic recovery", FR, 19 July 84, p.8; "CAI predicts fall in growth and calls for monetary targetting", FR, 22 April 85, p.6; "CAI warns on optimism", FR, 16 May 84, p.2; and the attitude of BCA to improved profitability, "Business Council urges higher profits before fresh investment", FR, 10 Sept. 84.
47. "Employers link jobless to youth wages", FR, 8 March 85, p.3.
48. "Gloomy employer response to wage rise", FR, 4 April 85, p.2.
49. "Employers poised for battle to resist super plan flow-on", FR, 7 Aug. 84; "Business plots own campaign" and "Disastrous to extend super-CAI", FR, 8 Nov. 84, p.3.
50. "Hurford rules out any allowance extension", FR, 26 Feb. 85, p.3; "Bid to keep export grants plan", FR, 15 Aug. 84; "Chamber warns Keating on investment allowances", FR, 13 Aug. 84.
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