



View from Japan

U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE COOPERATION: THE NEW GUIDELINES

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It is time to take advantage of the fact that Germany and Japan have a fair share of power in the world, as well as our support, friendship and respect. (Peter Tamoff, America's New Special Relations, *Foreign Affairs* vol.69 No.3, 1990)

The Prime Minister and the President agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan - U.S. Defense Co-operation to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the United States. The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy co-ordination, including studies on bilateral co-operation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan. (*The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security - Alliance for the 21st Century*, April 17, 1996)

Japanese Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright signed on April 28th 1998 the revised agreement on logistic support, supplies and services under Japan - US defense guidelines. The agreement is intended to operate at war time, compared with peace time in the agreement signed only two years earlier. These new guidelines are a significant development: this note indicates some areas of concern about their effects.

Background

Amid the confusion of the collapsing Cold War system, from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, Japan's domestic and foreign policies were aimed to maintain the *status quo*. This can be termed the 'moratorium Japan syndrome'. Meanwhile, the Western nations, especially the United States who had announced a 'Sea Change Project,' have been aiming to deepen their historical and structural analyses of the post-Cold War situation, to clarify their own role, to clarify relations with other countries and to be contentious in coping with new situations. This indicates the pursuit of a coherent philosophy in the post-Cold War era, emphasising the unavoidability of strategic friction, and a multi-layered strategy.¹

On the other hand, Japan, in conservative and progressive parties alike, has continued to lack:

- a clear recognition and analysis, based on Japan's historical and geographical characteristics, of the global situation;
- an examination of its own role in dealing with international situations;
- creative proposals for strategic policies going beyond abstract disputes over the Constitution of Japan.

Primary Feature of the New Guidelines

The Clinton administration's basic policy towards economic negotiations over Japan-U.S. trade frictions is to set numerical targets. The use of targets in political and military affairs is a primary feature of the New

1 These arguments are developed more fully in the following papers:
 Kawahara, K., (1994), International Aid and Japanese ODA in *the Political Economy on Developing Countries*, mineruba-shobou
 Kawahara, K., (1991), Implications of Japanese Gulf War Expenditure - on Strategic Friction - *Nagasaki Prefectural University Review*, Vol.25 No.1
 Kawahara, K., (1993), Political Economy of NAFTA - Multilayered Strategy in the United States - *Nagasaki Prefectural University Review*, Vol. 26 No.4

Guidelines agreement too. This feature is straightforwardly shown in section IV of the agreement regarding promotion of 'joint operation to examine planning and to establish common standards and procedures,' and construction of a 'bilateral co-ordination' mechanism.

The conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the settlement of the New Guidelines seem to be a response to the possibility of regional strife in the unclear situation of the post-Cold War era.

The New Guidelines specify joint engagement within six to eight months. This is abnormally speedy. The accelerated time schedule can be found not only in the New Guidelines but also in the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security that was originally going to be concluded in November, 1995 and was actually concluded in April 1996. The former Joint Declaration was going to study the agreement on reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies and services. But the later Joint Declaration changed the point to study strategic situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan, because the agreement on reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies and services was concluded only one day before the conclusion of Joint Declaration in April 1996! The intention of the U.S. government to impose a time limit was clearly shown in the hasty time schedule.

In a symposium held in Sasebo city, Tetsuo Maeda, a military analyst, pointed out that the New Guidelines had been decided under the leadership of bureaucrats and military authorities. Because they did not involve the Japanese Diet, that indicates a political crisis of democracy. However, the New Guidelines have not been adopted by the Japanese and US governments yet: only the results of studies by bureaucrats in both countries have been confirmed. There is an evident need for a national discussion among people in both countries on the pros and cons of the new strategic agreement and its political-economic implications.

Think Locally, Act Globally

Sasebo city is where one of the U.S. bases has been dramatically strengthened. An open symposium under the theme of the 'new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Co-operation' was held there by the

Kyushu Peace Studies Association and the Nagasaki Peace Research Institute on September 27th 1997. This was just three days after the New Guidelines had been decided by Japan and the United States. It was the first symposium of this kind held in Japan.

Mass media, scholars, and political parties alike are now putting forward competing views about options for 'bilateral co-operation in strategic situations in areas surrounding Japan' and 'the security system in a new stage'. The Sasebo Bureau Chief of the *Mainich* newspapers, who covered the Sasebo symposium, wrote an article in his column (Oct.6 1997) called 'Something Behind', asking 'Who would benefit from the new guidelines and regional conflicts?' and 'Where is the gigantic military industry that has become fat during the Cold War era targeting next?' These questions indicate the local mass media's increasing interest in global issues.

Matters of concern, which have been hardly referred to in Japan from the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security to the New Guidelines, include the posture and policy of negotiations with the Clinton administration, the bargaining processes and the motivation behind them. Japanese residents are now starting to express their opinions concerning these basic issues as well as existing problems with U.S. naval bases – the expansion of base facilities and entrance / exit of many kind of naval ships – which occur daily.

Empty Efforts for Diplomacy

The New Guidelines refer to the need for 'every effort including diplomacy to prevent [military] situations from occurring,' and 'every effort including diplomacy to prevent a further deterioration of [strategic] situations.' However, the focal point is to set numerical targets for military actions in areas surrounding Japan and to accelerate time schedules for implementation. Efforts for other than military affairs are not specified but only left blank.

It is worthy of note, however, that Joseph Nye and William Perry, who had virtually promoted the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the New Guidelines, have placed an emphasis on having an 'information

umbrella in place of the nuclear one,' and 'preventive defense' while preparing for the supposed worst situations. They seem to be seeking a new phase of U.S.-style crisis management. Study of this crisis management process, its economic motivation and the possibility of constructing a Japanese version of crisis management is necessary to provide a basis for challenging these developments.

Preventive Defense and Information Revolution

William Perry wrote in 'Defense in an Age of Hope' that the United States would shift its emphasis of crisis management. There would be a strategic change in the post-Cold War era from a deterrent strategy to a preventive strategy for dealing with emerging threats and then to military application of advanced technology so that the USA can realise a core ideology of the Marshall Plan. Joseph Nye emphasised in 'America's Information Edge' that it is a new mission for the United States to build co-operative relationships through dramatically progressed military information systems that have strengthened the capability to remove the ambiguity of threat. The new technology may also be seen as a means of extending the attraction of the American model of democracy and the market economy.

This role for the military industrial complex in the United States after the Cold War era is exactly that pointed out by the above-mentioned Sasebo Bureau Chief of the *Mainichi* newspapers who covered the Sasebo symposium from a local residents' point of view.

Share of Power

Setting numerical targets, not only in the economy but also in politics and military affairs, and accelerating the implementation system reflects the new interests of the military industrial complex after the Cold War. The United States has been freed from the threat and fear which bound its domestic and foreign policies for 50 years from December 8th, 1941 (the opening day of the Pacific War) to December 8th, 1991 when the

Soviet Union was dismantled, as pointed out by William Highland in '70 years of Foreign Affairs.'

On the other hand, Japan, under the 'moratorium Japan syndrome', has kept following the United States blindly due to the focus on a 'fair share of power' described in the first excerpt in the beginning of this paper.

Japanese Cities with U.S. Bases

Okinawa [an island in the Ryukyu group to the south of the main islands of Japan] was opposed to having its U.S. bases fixed by the settlement of the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security. There is an underlying economic reason for concern. The annual value of industrial shipments of the Okinawa Prefecture has been levelling off at around ¥520 billion from 1985 to 1995. Nago city, [in Okinawa] which is attracting attention due to the relocation of Futenma Air Station, recorded only ¥10 billion growth and its *per capita* income is less than 48% of the nation's average. Other cities with U.S. bases, such as Sasebo, Iwakuni, and Yokosuka, face a similar situation to that in Okinawa. Their value of industrial shipments tends to be low and stagnant. Kure and Maizuru, where bases are located only for the Japanese Self Defense Forces, showed some growth, from ¥610 billion to ¥680 billion, and from ¥160 billion to ¥250 billion respectively. That is in clear contrast with cities with U.S. bases.

A New Construction of Japanese Crisis Management

Considering the reality of cities with U.S. bases, the U.S. posture for negotiations and its underlying economic motivation, the position adopted by the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the New Guidelines doesn't seem to be the only choice in terms of post-Cold War security. There are other options for the bilateral relationship between Japan and the United States.

For instance, the U.S. magazine *Foreign Affairs* carried controversial papers about U.S. bases in Japan, written by Joseph Nye and Chalmers

Johnson ('The Case for Deep Engagement' vs. 'The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy'). I also made an initial proposal at a symposium on U.S. bases held in Okinawa in 1996 for a possible strategy for crisis management which would be suitable for the historical and geographical reality in each country and for the problems in Japan.²

What is the way forward for peace study from now on? Firstly, U.S. Forces and the Japanese Self Defense Forces should be examined in concrete terms in the context of the post-Cold War situation. Secondly, it is crucial to examine security issues concerning the areas surrounding Japan (in case of emergency) in well-balanced specific terms of crisis management. Thirdly, it is necessary to examine the posture and policies for negotiations by the Clinton administration. U.S. recognition of the global situation in the post-Cold War era is based on their analysis since the 'Sea Change Project' in the latter 1980s, in which the United States has been studying the global situation retrospectively back to the Peace of Westphalia, and in which the U.S.-style crisis management policy is being promoted to construct a global community.

Finally, East Asian cities with U.S. bases and other cities with bases across the world need to consider how, as base cities, they can face the gigantic power of the United States on a more equal basis. The symposium held in Sasebo was a small step in this direction. It is necessary to review squarely the relationships to the global community which the United States is aiming at, and to nurture equal relationships, solidarity and participation among base cities in pursuit of the goals of decentralisation and non-aligned status. The alternative to undemocratic policies like the New Guidelines is to develop this peripheral networking.

2 Kimio Kawahara (1997), *The Relationship between Industrialization and Militarization in Asia-Pacific Region in Japan and Okinawa after the Cold War era*, Tanizawa-Shobou